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increasing prominence for the pursuit of transnational justice and individual accountability. The aftermath 
of the terrifying attacks on America on September  
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Governance is a new term in the development dictionary but the underlying concept is as 
old as human civilization. Effective governance of natural, economic, and human resources 
has been the hallmark of most successful civilizations. There had always been an institutional 
basis for the material wealth and the political power of great nations and empires. The 
concept was not novel for economists either. The writings of some earlier economists, such 
as Adam Smith, Joseph Shumpeter, and Simon Kuznets, to name but a few, contain plenty 
of subtle references to some of the central concerns embodied in the present day concept of 
governance. Though politics seems to be a term arcane to most economists today, the 
subject of economics was historically treated in the framework of ‘Political Economy.’ Asian 
Drama, the famous treatise of Swedish Nobel Prize Winner Gunnar Myrdal is known more 
for its institutional analysis and less for its economic explanation of poverty. Other 
contemporary economic thinkers, such as Hirschman, Coase, Olson, North, and Stiglitz, 
among others, have emphasized the interface between institutions and economic forces. 
Thanks to these and more recent economists and social scientists, it is generally recognized 
today that a stable political, institutional, and social framework is an essential precondition 
for economic growth and development.  
 
I. THE MOTIVATION FOR EMPIRICS 
Why is it important to quantify governance? 
 
‘…as long as we are unable to put our arguments into figures, the voice of our science, although 
occasionally it may help to dispel gross errors, will never be heard by practical men. They are, by 
instinct, econometricians all of them, in their distrust of anything not amenable to exact proof.’
  J. A. Shumpeter, 1933) 
 
Empirics are important to test ideas and hypotheses against real-world evidence and to find 
plausible answers to some of the most intractable questions. Resolving some of these 
puzzles holds considerable significance both for our economic understanding and for the 
sheer impact of these propositions on the welfare of millions of people. A few examples:  
1.  How do institutions contribute to the evolution of national and world income 
distribution? 
2.  Can governance account for differences in cross-country growth rates? 
3.  Can the poverty of poor countries be devoted to lack of inputs and technology 
differences only? How important is the role of institutions in keeping nations poor? 
 
Quantification can improve our understanding of a concept that concerns issues of great 
practical relevance. From the civil wars in Africa to the worsening income distribution in 
Latin America, from the economic transition in Russian and East European states to the 
success of economic reform in developing countries, governance affects the way 
governments design and implement public policies.  
An empirical investigation of these key puzzles requires data that is amenable to 
modern econometric analysis. From the variety of explanations that are offered to 
                                                 
1 The paper benefited from discussions with Daniel Kaufmann, Nick Manning, Steve Knack, Paul 
Collier, Nadeem ul Haque, and Jonathan Temple. The usual disclaimers apply.   3
understand these puzzles, careful empirical investigation allows us to select those that are 
closest to the real-world situation. But empirics are perhaps more important for inspiring action-
oriented reform than for generating and validating ideas. A couple of hard-hitting statistics can exert 
more public pressure for reform on policymakers than lengthy commission reports. 
Consider the comparison: ‘if the Philippines could reduce its corruption level to the much 
lower level of that in Singapore, it would raise its investment-to-GDP ratio by 6.6 percentage 
points.’
2 No matter how scientifically imprecise such comparisons may be, such indicators 
prove immensely useful in jolting official slumber.    
That statistics can create lobbies for change is exemplified by the Transparency 
International’s success in initiating debates in much of the poor developing world on the 
evils of corruption. Interesting empirical estimates of growth losses due to corruption draw 
immediate public attentionbringing home the magnitude of socio-economic loss and the 
urgency for reform.  Diagnostic surveys have also helped identify weak links in the 
governance chain and focused public opinion on the critical issues of institutional 
development.  
As the following sections show, while the progress in developing governance 
indicators is significant, a great deal of business remains unfinished. Though the proliferation 
of governance indicators has increased our understanding of development phenomenally, it 
has also made us much more aware of our technical limitations. Thus, the proud sense of 
intellectual discovery should not undermine the need to be more humble about the findings. 
It is useful to remember that governance is essentially a qualitative phenomenon, the 
quantification of which would always be subject to considerable empirical limitations. 
Researchers have so far attempted to use proxy indicators for measuring governance, a 
concept that purports to capture several complex and multi-faceted dimensions. 
It is also critical to avoid a pre-occupation with quantification and a neglect of 
equally important social, political, and historical processes
3. There is a need to combine 
historical, sociological, and political imagination with empirical certainty. In order to form 
relevant hypotheses and to test innovative causal mechanisms, we need to complement the 
wealth of empirical information with the broader historical and political information
4.  It is 
one of those fields where economics cannot simply be abstracted away from historical and 
political concerns. 
 
II. GOVERNANCE INDICATORS: A MUSHROOMING INDUSTRY 
 
Recent years have seen a remarkable growth in quantitative indicators on governance. In 
fact, developing such indicators has become a growth industry in itself. Estimates differ but 
there are roughly over 150 such indicators developed by international organizations, research 
institutes, and private organizations. The phenomenal growth in governance indicators has 
partly been fueled by a rising demand for such indicators by researchers and policymakers. 
                                                 
2 For details of such comparisons, see for instance, Mauro (1997), Wei (1997), and World Bank 
(2000). 
3 Gunnar Myrdal, for instance, warns against such a potential bias, whereby interesting arguments are 
downplayed for lack of quantification. It is worth remembering that Myrdal was one of the earlier 
economists to emphasize the negative effects of corruption. It took a lag of 27 years to appreciate the 
consequences of corruption after Mauro’s (1995) attempt to empirically estimate the effects of 
corruption.   
4 Temple (1999) discusses specifically the utility of conducting historical studies.    4
The use of such indicators in economic and political research became more fashionable after 
the initial work of Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, who popularized the using of 
alternatives measures such as the International Country Risk Guide Indicators (ICRG), 
developed by credit risk rating agencies 
5. Often, the purpose is to guide foreign investors 
about economic, political and administrative efficiency in countries of interest. These 
indicators are developed by credit risk rating agencies to guide foreign investors.  
Just as the concept of governance is broad, the indicators purporting to measure it 
are also varied. There is now a fairly wide range of indicators measuring such diverse 
concepts as corruption, civil liberties, ethnic conflict, rule of law, effectiveness of judiciary, 
and bureaucratic delays, to name but a few. There are several other indicators that tend to 
measure government effectiveness through precise institutional arrangements, such as the 
size and pay structure of the civil service and various characteristics of political structures.     
Measures that attempt to evaluate government performance have been broadly 
categorized as process and performance measures
6. The difference is self-evident: process 
measures try to capture specific institutional arrangements that are most often associated 
with better government performance, whereas performance measures are routine 
assessments of government effectiveness. Thus, the process measures can be seen as 
providing information on the channels through which a particular institutional feature is 
believed to be associated with better governance outcomes.  
The key difference between these two types of indicators is the extent of valuation 
and beliefs required in the use of such indicators. A greater degree of individual judgment is 
required to compare countries according to process indicators. The problem arises because 
many of these beliefs and valuations are not based on decisive evidence. A typical example is 
the evaluation required in comparing the level of civil service pay across different countries. 
Low civil service pay is widely believed to characterize a corrupt and inefficient bureaucratic 
structure, implying that improving the pay structure can reduce bureaucratic corruption. 
However, so far the evidence linking civil service pay structure to corruption remains 
inconclusive
7. Thus, compensation level in the civil service, in and of itself, is a poor 
descriptor of an institutional arrangement that is conducive to better bureaucratic 
performance.  
  There are several other features that differentiate governance indicators, apart from 
the specific approach employed to measure government performance. Indicators differ with 
respect to the number of countries they cover, the time period for the availability of 
statistics, the precise methodology of indicators (e.g. expert surveys, polls etc.), the accuracy 
with which governance is measured, and the transparency and replicability of indicators. This 
diversity in the availability of governance indicators doesn’t make our life easier. If anything, 
indicators of so many different kinds and stripes pose a real selection dilemma for the 
researcher. There seems to be an embarrassment of riches. As it turns out, the very features 
that distinguish these indicators can prove insightful in deciding which indicators are 
preferable.  
                                                 
5 Knack, Stephen and Philip Keefer. 1995. ‘Institutions and economic performance: Cross-country tests using 
alternative institutional measures.’ Economics and Politics 7(3): 207-227.  
6 See Knack and Manning (2000) for a detailed discussion. 
7 Rauch and Evans (2000), for instance, do not find a robust association between civil service compensation 
and various corruption indices.    5
I will first review the various problems inherent in the use of widely available governance 
indicators and then proceed to discuss the approaches offered to mitigate some of these data 
deficiencies.  
 
Country coverageCoverage across countries varies a great deal between different indicators. 
Limited country coverage reduces the potential utility of these indicators in studying issues 
of governance. Indicators with inadequate country coverage can pose substantial difficulties 
in establishing a meaningful relationship between elements of governance and other 
variables. Specific econometric issues that deal with such data limitations are presented in 
box 1 below. Data coverage for countries is a key issue, especially when countries are being 
ranked. In particular, many of the problems of cross-country ratings and comparisons are 
accentuated in the face of smaller sample size. For instance, Knack and Manning (2000) 
offer a useful example on the use of BERI index that covers 50 countries only.  Country 
rankings are relative to the overall sample. Thus, a country with poor rating on BERI index 
may perform better on some other indicator with more complete country coverage. Thus, 
limited country coverage can make cross-country ratings susceptible to misinterpretation. 
 
Coverage over timeThe availability of indicators with sufficient time coverage is important for 
better econometric interpretation: for identifying the effect of institutional factors. It is also 
helpful in gauging country performance over time, both individual and in relation to other 
countries. Time series data on governance is needed to determine whether institutional 
dysfunction in developing countries is a transient or a continuing feature. It is crucial to 
consider the trends, as governance indicators can be significantly influenced by recent 
events.  
 
Accuracy of indicatorsGovernance indicators, particularly those that are based on subjective 
assessments, may not accurately measure the underlying concept. In particular, subjective 
indicators are usually based on surveys of experts, investors, or the general public, which can 
not only be shaped by recent political events and measures of economic growth but are also 
subject to herd effects (Somerville and Taffler). There is a danger that these individual 
valuations may not accurately reflect the actual governance conditions in a particular 
country. It is, thus, difficult to disentangle governance dimensions from these recent political 
and economic developments. More specifically, subjective assessments that are influenced by 
recent events are not of much help in determining the direction of causality between 
institutions and economic performance. 
The methodology and implementation of many of these indicators is not always 
clearly articulated and varies from indicator to indicator. Subjective indicators may also be 
unduly influenced by the ideology of their publishers, whether non-profit organizations or 
credit-rating agencies. But such measurement issues are not unique to subjective indicators 
alone. Objective indicators, such as civil service compensation are vulnerable to serious 
methodological problems. The civil-service wage data does not always account for the non-
wage benefits that vary considerably across countries and can make substantial differences in 
the total compensation package. Moreover, such data is complied from national sources, 
where definitions of variables and the quality of data vary considerably. Objective measures 
are also exposed to another problem: the same country may have ‘idiosyncratic’ scores on 
different indicators. Many of these measurement issues raise a natural question: Can the data 
be used for rigorous econometric purposes to establish possible economic links? Box 1   6
summarizes some crucial econometric issues in this regard. That the statistical analysis is 
beset with many problems means that the regression evidence should be treated as 
suggestive, not conclusive. It also requires that conclusions be humbly drawn. These 
technical limitations should facilitate a more sobering agenda, not treated as a disaster. As 
the next section shows, several econometric techniques can be allowed to mitigate such data 
limitations. 
 
   7
Difficulty of cross-country comparisonsData and measurement discrepancies in governance 
indicators make precise 
country comparisons dubious. 
Thus, comparing country 
scores can be a controversial 
exercise. In an important 
paper, Kaufmann et al (1999a) 
offer an alternative approach 
of devising ‘broad categorical 
groupings’ that identify 
country vulnerability on a 
given indicator.  They have 
shown that the margin of 
error for individual countries 
on many of these subjective 
indicators can vary a great 
deal, implying the futility of 












III. WHERE TO GO FROM 
HERE? 
 
As the preceding section 
shows, the proliferation of 
data on governance and its 
easy accessibility is not a 
perfect consolation for 
researchers in the field. The 
use of such data is 
accompanied by myriad 
technical issues. But, the 
question remains: How can 
one avoid falling these 
popular traps in the use of 
governance data, particularly 
subjective indicators? There 
are no straight answers, no 
Box 1: Governance indicators: some econometric issues 
 
The use of governance indicators in statistical regressions raises 
a number of econometric issues. The following are particularly 
important:  
 
Endogeneity.  Governance indicators are far from being 
exogenous. First, they are likely to be measured with error. 
Second, they might be subjected to reverse causation. An 
example. Institutions are both a cause and consequence of better 
economic performance. Institutional weakness could be an 
outcome of policy reversals, economic downturns, or civil 
conflicts, for instance. Third, endogeneity could be an outcome 
of spurious correlation. Governance indicators could capture the 
effect of some missing variables, causing the familiar omitted 
variable bias.   
  
Sample Selection Bias. The different sample coverage of 
governance indicators restricts researchers to smallerand 
hence, not necessarily representativesamples. The results 
could thus not be generalized.  
 
Model Uncertainty. This is a problem specific to linear regression 
models, where there is considerable uncertainty as to the choice 
of appropriate regressors. It is as much relevant to regressions 
that include governance indicators. 
 
Influential Observations. As is common in regression models, the 
results could be driven by a handful of influential statistics or 
outliers. Much of the regression evidence on governance is 
susceptible to this problem, yet few papers tend to directly 
address this.  
 
Non-Linearities. In a concept as multi-dimensional and complex 
as governance, a non-linear relationship might not be 
unexpected. Recent papers have shown greater sensitivity to this 
issue by including interaction and quadratic terms. A key 
example in this regard is the use of a squared term of the 
democracy variable in Barro’s regressions, which is used to 
demonstrate how the benefits of democracy are reaped in 
countries beyond a certain threshold of income.  
 
Correlation versus Causation. It is difficult to infer causation from 
cross-sectional regressions. In most cases, at best only some 
degree of correlation could be identified. While the panel 
regressions could be more informative here, governance 
indicators are found to be relatively less significant in panel 
investigations.      8
easy solutions. Knack and Manning (2000) offer a critical test that requires indicators to 
fulfill some stringent conditions. These conditions can be used to judge the suitability of a 
particular indicator. (See box 2).  
In practice, very few indicators would fulfill all the conditions outlined in box 2. As a 
whole, objective indicators stand a better chance of meeting these criteria, since they are 
more likely to implicate specific institutional arrangements and are easily replicable. Though 
most objective indicators may have a narrower dimension, but the institutions are more 
identifiable. At present, very few such objective indicators are available. Knack and Manning 
(2000) offer some potential candidates: contract-intensive money, civil-service pay relative to 
the private sector pay, waiting time for telephone lines, policy volatility, and some other 
descriptive measures of political structures. 
 
Objective indicators have their own 
troubles, however. They are susceptible to 
measurement problems as well and can also require 
a certain degree of judgment. For instance, it is not 
certain if a particular institutional arrangement will 
lead to a specific outcome in every country. 
Obviously, it would be foolish to expect scientific 
regularity here. Governance is a result of a complex 
interplay of social, ethnic, political, and economic 
processes. One size can’t fit all, since there are a 
variety of experiences. What is more, objective 
indicators often provide limited information on 
how well institutions perform.  
There are ultimately some trade-offs 
involved in the choice between objective and 
subjective indicators. Such choice may depend 
partly on the purpose for which indicators are to be 
used. If the end-purpose is to test the broad 
contribution of governance to a country’s 
development, subjective indicators can be fruitfully 
used. If on the other hand policy insights on 
specific institutions are to be obtained, subjective 
indicators may not be of much help here.  
In the end, the choice may depend on 
simple concerns like the easy availability of time-
series data on governance. However fancy the idea 
may be, objective indicators are few and far 
between and do not generally cover the more 
interesting dimensions, such as civil liberties, trust, 
etc. Subjective data is often the only source of 
evidence for economists working in this area. It is 
difficult to doubt the need for developing better 
objective indicators and this poses a momentous task for national governments and 
international organizations. In the interim, there are certainly ways to meaningfully use the 
subjective indicators.   
 
Box 2: Critical dimensions of 
governance indicators 
 
There can be at least five different ways 
to judge the efficacy of governance 
indicators: 
 
Relation with particular institutions: This 
concerns the manner in which indicators 
implicate particular institutions. These 
indicators can help identify the 
institutional channel through which 
government performance is affected.  
 
Relation with outcomes: This refers to the 
degree of specificity with which 
indicators relate to the outcomes of good 
governance (such as poverty reduction). 
 
Replicability and transparency: This relates to 
the ease with which indicators can be 
replicated and their methodology and 
implementation accessed. 
 
Quality and accuracy of indicators: This 
corresponds to indicators that measure 
more accurately the underlying concept 
and use high quality data. 
 
Data coverage: this relates to coverage of 
the indicators over time and across 
countries. 
 
Source: Knack and Manning (2000).   9
At least five broad lessons can be distilled from the available literature. First, subjective 
indicators based on a assessments of a larger number of respondents, whether experts, 
investors, or citizens, should generally be preferred. Second, many empirical studies tend to 
prefer indicators produced by private agencies, since they are subscribed by investors. It is 
believed that in such cases there are greater incentives for accuracy as the indicators ‘face a 
market test.’  Third, an indicator that is more strongly correlated with other governance 
indicators is likely to be more accurate than an indicator measuring a similar dimension but 
only weakly correlated with other governance indicators. Fourth, indicators that meet a 
research test better ought to be preferred. There is a case for preferring indicators that have 
found a wider use in empirical studies. Fifth, indicators with a greater range of countries and 
time are considered more appropriate than those with limited time and country range. Sixth, 
subjective indicators can also be aggregated to yield more precise estimates of governance. 
This is the subject of the next section, to which I turn now.  
    
IV. AGGREGATING GOVERNANCE INDICATORS 
 
‘The manner in which, when a sufficient number of instances are taken, aggregate regularity is found 
to emerge out of individual irregularity has been one of the most striking results of statistical 
research.’(Keynes, 1891). 
 
Aggregation of indicators allows distilling information from a vast array of governance data 
and does away with many of the limitations involved in using subjective indicators. The 
resulting composite indicators summarize the available evidence much better than the 
individual indicators. Composite indicators are frequently viewed as being more accurate, 
reliable and more useful for cross-country research than individual indicators. Allowing for 
data for more countries, aggregate indicators greatly facilitate the cross-country comparisons. 
There are some downsides to aggregation as well. While composite indicators provide a 
general indictment of a country’s institutional performance, they may not be very 
appropriate for identifying appropriate institutional reforms. With aggregate indicators, it is 
difficult to identify the channels through which the institutional effect operates.  
 
Though several techniques could be used to aggregate governance indicators, I will briefly 
consider three major techniques.  
 
Unobserved Components Model 
 
Using data from 170 countries over the period 1997-98, Kaufmann and associates (1999) 
carry out an aggregation exercise using an unobserved components model. They use a larger 
set of indices to form six component indices: voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, and control of corruption. Their 
major finding is that ‘aggregate’ governance indicators are imprecise: the margins for error 
for individual countries and the confidence intervals are large. This is despite the high 
correlation observed among most governance indicators. Such high degree of imprecision of 
governance indicators means that it is difficult to rank countries on levels of governance. 
One could arrive at broad groupings (high, medium, and low), at best.   
   10
 
 
Latent Variable Method 
 
Temple (1999) suggests an alternative route: ‘one promising way forward is to combine 
indicators using latent variable methods, and then examine the robustness of these overall 
measures’. The social and political influences on growth can be modeled as latent variables 
related to a variety of observable factors. 
 
Principal Components Analysis 
 
The high degree of correlation among various governance indicators is well known. Principal 
Components Analysis is a simple method to identify the amount of variation attributable to a 
particular indicator. Different component indices are aggregated with unknown weights. The 
principal components technique has largely been ignored in the literature but it offers a great 
deal of potential for summarizing information from indicators from a variety of sources.  
 
V. THE DEFINITIONAL CONTEXT 
 
What is it that we are trying to measure? Governance is a multi-dimensional concept. It is 
broad enough to allow for interpretational differences. The notions of governance are varied 
and could thus have important measurement implications. Recent years have seen an 
evolving consensus on the major constituents of good governance. But owing to ideological 
differences of the proponents of these different concepts of governance, a varying degree of 
emphasis is attached to various dimensions of governance. This is related, in part, to 
differences relating to the ends of better governance and the means to achieving these ends.  
     The debate on governance indicators has so far been pre-occupied by concerns of growth 
and investment. A relatively small number of studies have attempted to associate governance 
indicators with human development outcomes. The concern for human development largely 
remains an after thought, however. Although there have been attempts to roughly correlate 
governance indicators with indicators of human development, very few studies have actually 
attempted to explore the various channels through which governance impacts on 
development outcomes. Subjective indices demonstrate a causal link with development 
outcomes but the knowledge of underlying mechanisms remains weak. For instance, 
indicators such as rule of law, corruption, and political instability are correlated with health, 
nutritional and educational outcomes but there is little insight on how such outcomes are 
generated.   
      It is very likely that such correlation between governance indicators and development 
outcomes operates through higher per capita incomes. Strong institutions improve economic 
performance, which in turn favorably impacts on development indicators. But there is a need 
to go beyond such indirect evidence.  
     Another difference between governance definitions emanates from the major realms of 
activity covered. Many definitions in vogue are short of being comprehensive and multi-
dimensional. There is a need for wider domains, where the major agents, such as the private 
sector, the civil society, and the political systems are all included. Several efforts have been 
made to enlarge the governance agenda. In a preliminary attempt, HDSA 1999 combines the 
economic, political, and civic dimensions of governance in one single indicator, the Humane 
Governance Index (HGI). Indicators under each dimension are provided in table 1 below.    11
Kaufmann et al (1999) combine 31 different indicators into different clusters, such as the rule 
of law, government effectiveness, voice and accountability, to name a few. The Voice and 
Accountability cluster includes a number of indicators measuring different aspects of the 
political process, civil liberties, and political rights. Variables measuring independence of the 
media are also included in this cluster. Government Effectiveness combines dimensions such as 
the quality of public services and the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the 
degree to which public servants are insulated from political pressures, and the credibility of 
government’s commitment to policies. Similarly, the Rule of Law combines several indicators 
on the existence and effectiveness of regulations.  
 
Table 1: Indicators for Human Governance Index, 1999 
 
Dimension  Indicator 
Economic Governance  •  Inflation 
•  Overall budget deficit (% of GDP) 
•  Current account deficit (% of GDP) 
•  Public health expenditure (% of GDP) 
•  Public education expenditure (% of GDP) 
•  Ratio of official to parallel exchange rate 
Political Governance  •  Corruption 
•  Bureaucratic quality 
•  Democratic accountability 
•  Ethnic tension 
•  Government stability 
•  Law and order 
•  Socio-economic conditions 
Civic Governance  •  Freedom of expression 
•  Non-discrimination 
•  Political participation 
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VI. GOVERNANCE INDICATORS AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES 
 
The availability of a vast array of governance indicators has brought a number of useful 
common sense relationships into the realm of statistical credibility. Governance was until 
recently a peripheral concern and has been effectively brought to the center of the 
development debates. But there is a huge unfinished agenda: much less is known on the 
critical linkages and there is too much generalization. In particular, much less is known on 
how better governance leads to improved human development outcomes. Our current 
knowledge has not gone much farther than simple associations and correlation. All we know 
is that countries with better governance also happen to be those with better social indicators. 
Also, even where such mechanisms are known, their relevance in different regions is hardly 
appreciated. The relationship between governance and development could be generated by 
mechanisms that vary in different regions. Imaginative evidence is beginning to emerge. For 
instance, as one study shows (see below) the effect of corruption on inequality is much more 
pronounced in Latin America than in other continents.  
 
The following describes selected examples where key governance concerns were linked with 




Not much could be asserted beyond some simple well known truths. Corruption leads to 
lower economic growth. Many channels are at work here: misallocation of talent, reduced 
investment levels, growth of unofficial economy, distorted investment priorities, and state 
capture by the corporate elite, among others. Corruption imposes a distortionary tax, it 
distorts investment priorities, and causes a severe misallocation of talents. Besides hampering 
growth, corruption has also been shown to increase income inequality and poverty (Gupta et 
al, 1998). Several channels have been described for this purpose, such as regressive taxes, 
poor targeting of social programmes, unequal access to education, reduced social spending, 
and higher investment risks for the poor (World Bank, 2000). In a recent study, Kaufmann et 
al (1999b) show that corruption is associated with an increase in infant mortality and a 
reduction in life expectancy and literacy. Similarly, the UNDP’s Human Poverty Index (HPI) 
is negatively related to indices of governance and corruption, even after controlling for GDP 
per capita. As described earlier, the exact mechanisms are less well-known and there is a 
great room for further imaginative work here.  
 
Li et al (2000) examine the effects of corruption on income inequality, as measured by the 
Gini coefficient. A one standard-deviation increase in corruption raises the Gini by roughly 
five points. Countries with greater inequality in asset (mainly land) ownership experience a 
more devastating effect of corruption on growth.  
 
Several interesting implications follow from this:  
•  Corruption and income inequality are related in an U-shaped way: countries with an 
intermediate level of corruption experience a more unequal income distribution than 
countries with too little or too much corruption.  
•  The links between corruption and inequality are best understood from a theoretical 
framework borrowed from Murphy et al (1991). The setting is simple, with a two-fold   13
division of the economy into a traditional and modern productive sectors. Owing to to 
its reliance on permits, quotas, and licenses, the modern sector is more prone to 
corruption.  
•  The effect of corruption on inequality hinges on a number of other factors. For one, 
government spending provides a critical link. Higher government spending financed by 
higher taxes on the modern sector reduces the income differential between the modern 
and the traditional sector. Thus, the inequality-raising effects of corruption are likely to 
be smaller in countries with more government spending. Similarly, the inequality-raising 
effects of corruption are smaller where the initial asset distribution is more skewed. 
The reason: a more unequal distribution of assets reduces the poor’s access to credit 
markets, preventing migration to the modern high-wage sector.  
•  The growth-reducing effect of corruption is stronger, when government spending is 
higher and land distribution is more unequal. 
 
It is difficult to establish causality from corruption to development, even though it appears 
to be associated with adverse human development outcomes. A higher incidence of 
corruption is often associated with lower school attainment, higher population growth, low 
levels of financial depth, and higher levels of poverty. Some linkages have been espoused, 




The adverse effect of ethnic conflict on growth has been documented by a spate of recent 
research (most notably by Easterly and Levine, 1997). Ethnic conflict is a recurrent feature in 
societies fractionalized on ethnic lines. Using the Ethnic Fractionalization Index, recent 
studies espouse a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and economic growth. The 
role of ethnic divisions in retarding growth has been particularly noticeable in the case of 
Africa (Easterly and Levine, 1997). The links between ethnic fractionalization and economic 
growth are myriadboth direct and indirect. Ethnic splits could reduce the ability of poor 
groups in financing human capital accumulation, hampering the productive potential of 
society. Ethnically polarized societies are also susceptible to a higher degree of social 
conflict. Such social polarization emanating from ethnic tensions could also lead to wide 
policy shifts (Knack and Keefer, 2000). Similarly, ethnic divisions could mean lower social 
capital, which is now recognized as an ingredient for promoting growth.  
     The broader development consequences of ethnic polarization are also well established. 
Ethnically diverse cities spend less on public goods provision, as recently shown for US 
cities and counties by Alesian, Baqir, and Easterly (1999). Ethnic diversity has been shown to 
be associated with poor quality of public services, political instability, and lower schooling.  
     How do institutions impact on these links between ethnicity, growth, and development? 
It turns out that many of the negative consequences of ethnic diversity are exacerbated in the 
presence of weak institutions. Thus, ethnic divisions are socially and economically more 
harmful, where institutions are weak. In the light of this evidence, good governance assumes 
even more significance in ethnically divisive societies. Some would go as far as saying that 
strong institutions provide a way of resolving ethnic conflicts (Easterly, 2000).  




Several variables measuring socio-political instability have become popular in recent years, 
such as political assassinations, riots, revolutions, coups, demonstrations, etc. the results are 
mixed, with varying levels of significance in growth regressions. Such variables have often 
been combined in a single aggregate statistic or index through such techniques as principal 
components and factor reduction. The general result that emerges from a vast array of such 
studies is that socio-political instability is harmful for growth and investment. 
     Some of the most interesting evidence using political variables relates to the link between 
democracy and growth. In a recent paper, Rodrik (2000) summarizes it as: 
 
•  Democracy promotes long-term economic growth 
•  Democracy helps achieve short-term stability 
•  Democracy assists in managing the adverse shocks better 
•  Democracy delivers better distributional outcomes 
 
The evidence is suggestive, though far from conclusive. Hard evidence on the direct 
channels between democracy and growth are difficult to get by, though democracy is 
believed to influence growth through a variety of indirect channels, such as the accumulation 
of human capital. Whether democracy promotes or hinders economic growth depends in 
part on the level of income. In his analysis, famous macroeconomist, Robert Barro has 
convincingly shown the difficulty of maintaining strong democratic institutions below a 
certain level of income.  
     It is also not very clear whether it is democracy that fosters growth or is it growth that 
facilitates democratization. It turns out that democracy is both a cause and a consequence of 
economic growth. Unfortunately, much of the regression evidence on democracy and 
growth is plagued by the likelihood of such simultaneity. The upshot is that the results are 
rendered less reliable, even though democracy is often instrumented with other variables in 
formal econometric regressions.     
     There is yet another problem. In linking democracy with growth, the existing research 
adopts a uni-focal perspective. This happens in two ways. First, the conventional indicators 
for democracy often encapsulate a more restricted notion of political participation. Second, 
the single-minded focus on the link between democracy and growth could be restrictive. 
Greater political participation is probably an end in itself, not just a means to higher growth. 
Let me turn to these separately.   
     Much of the evidence on the link between democracy and growth comes from regression 
analysis using a democracy measure derived from the Freedom House’s civil and political 
rights indices. These indices are, at best, a weak characterization of the notion of democracy, 
which goes beyond formal electoral procedures. There is more to political participation than 
just a ballot box. In many developing societies formal political arrangementssuch as the 
eligibility to vote, political parties, parliaments, etccoexist with informal levers to control 
state power. Thus, self-serving elites could often manipulate formal procedures to their   15
advantage. It is no surprise, then, that in many countries elections could easily turn into a 
dull ritualoften recycling the powerful elite
8. 
     What does this add up to? There is a need, I believe, to move beyond narrow measures of 
democracymeasures that are often too focused on voting rights and the existence of 
multi-party political competition. Luckily, political indicators have seen a phenomenal 
growth in recent years. This has not merely been an exercise in increasing quantity. Many of 
these indicators offer substantial qualitative improvement in terms of techniques and 
concepts.  
     This growing political data offers several advantages. First, unlike previous indicators, it 
offers strong theoretical connections. They are mostly derived from positive political science 
theory.  
     Second, far from being loosely defined, the institutional arrangements are more narrowly 
implicated. Two examples. The ‘Political Constraints Index’ measures the strength of a 
political system from a particular anglethat of the degree of constraints on executive 
discretion. It focuses on two structural elements of political systems: the number of 
independent government branches with a veto power and the distribution of preferences 
across and within these branches. Similarly, the ‘Competitiveness of Political Participation’ 
from the well-acclaimed POLITY III database specifically measures the ‘extent to which 
non-elites are able to access institutional structures for political expression.’ It investigates 
whether political participation is (a) competitive (b) transitional (c) fractional (d) restricted or 
(e) suppressed.  
     Third, some of these newly developed indicators tend to provide an objective assessment 
of political institutions. The Database of Political Institutions (DPI) developed by the World 
Bank, for instance, introduces a number of such objective indicators that purport to measure 
specific institutional arrangements. Some of these variables tend to capture novel 
dimensions, such as the tenure and stability of governments, the existence of institutional 
checks and balances, fragmentation of opposition and government parties in the legislatures, 
to name a few. As discussed earlier, being more precise and free from perception biases, 
objective indicators are often viewed to be preferable over subjective indicators.      
    Democracy has economic payoffs that are broader than just achieving economic growth. 
As latest research shows, countries with participatory political systems are more amenable to 
experiencing economic stability. Rodrik (2000) considers the relationship between 
democracy and economic volatility by regressing the standard deviation of real per capita 
GDP growth on democracy and selected control variables during the period 1960-89. The 
coefficient on the democracy variable turns out to be negative. Such a negative relationship 
between macro-economic volatility and democracy is evident from figure 1. It displays a 
partial scatter plot between volatility and political institutionsa principal components 
measure of three indices: democracy, competitiveness of political participation, and the 
political constraints index.  
          Democracy is associated with broad development gains. It is a human right and an 
essential ingredient to achieving better human development outcomes. Development is 
freedom, as Amartya Sen proclaims. Human catastrophes, like famines, are an exception 
under democracies. In short, participatory political systems are an excellent means to 
enlarging human choices. This is more or less a part of conventional development wisdom 
                                                 
8 In many Latin American and African countries, entrenched elites like military attempt to turn the 
democratic system to their advantage.   16
now. Yet, we are still far away from producing enough supportive evidence to this effect. 
Some is available, yet a lot more evidence needs to be discovered, with clearly defined 
linkages. Evidence from the 1,500 World Bank-financed projects suggests that civil 
libertiesan important component of the democracy variableand citizen participation 
were found as important factors for project success. 
 
 
                        FIGURE 1: VOLATILITY AND POLITICAL INSTIUTIONS 





There are only a few measures of social capital available. In an interesting attempt, Knack 
and Keefer (1997) use measures of trust and civic norm from the World Values Survey by 
Inglehart (1994). They demonstrate that by strengthening informal institutions, social capital 
could have both a direct and an indirect effect on growth. More important, income equality 
and low ethnic divisions are also related to trust and civic cooperation. Trust and education 
are also positively correlated, though such a result is likely to suffer from endogeneity. The 
link could be either way: from Trust to education and vice-versa. The empirical link between 






























































































































































VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
TO BE ADDED 
 
A number of lessons learned…..  
 
More indicators for the same governance dimension preferred over a single indicator…..  
 
Need to avoid precise country rankings. Broad groupings….may be…… 
 
Several relatively under-addressed areas….using indicators to implicate particular institutions 
for reform purposes….widening the definition….identifying critical links between 
governance and development….greater focus on power structures that abort social 
development….the misgovernance imposed by ongoing developments, such as globalization 
and adjustment programmes… 
 
Case studies approaches are welcome….need to complement available data with survey data 
…….need to combine statistical evidence with historical case studies……   
 
Important to consider indicators over time rather than just a point in time…to allow for 
comparisions…….. 
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Ideas for figures/tables/graphs 
 
1.  plot country growth rates against some composite indicator of governance. 
2.  simple correlation matrix for a range of institutional variables and HDI average 
3.  plot a composite governance indicator against income inequality. 
4.  plot corruption perception index against Human Poverty Index. 
5.  Income distribution and growth 
6.  unbundling governance: the world bank 
7.  kinds of indicators used in different studies 
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Selected governance indicators 
 




Political Risk Services/ 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
(www.prsgroup.com) 
Corruption in government; 
Law and order; 
and  bureaucratic quality 
Experts 130  1982- 















Experts 161  1995- 
Global Competitiveness Report  Civil service independence 
from politics; competence of 
public sector personnel; tax 










quality of government 
services; corruption and red 





Transparency International (TI)  Corruption perceptions index Aggregation  99  1995- 
World Competitiveness 
Yearbook 
Bribing and corruption; tax 
evasion; public service 
exposed to political 
interference; personal security 




Kaufmann, Kray and Zoido-
Lobaton (1999) 
Graft; Rule of Law; Voice 
and Accountability; Political 
instability and violence; 
government effectiveness; 








Experts 172  1972- 
Contract-intensive Money 
Clague et al (1999) 





Civil service employment and 
pay (Schiavo-Campo et al 1997 
and forthcoming) 
Variables on public sector 
pay and employment 
Objective 
measure 
80 to 100   1997 
and 
2000 
Weberian comparative state data 
project 
Various dimensions of 








Polity 98 project  Descriptive measures of 
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Database of Political institutions 
(DPI) by Beck et al (2000) 





Political Constraint Index 
By Henisz (2000) 
Number of independent 
branches of government with 
veto power and the 
distribution of preferences 
across and within these 
branches 
………… 140  1960- 
Policy volatility (World Bank)  An objective measure of 
policy coherence and 
predictability obtained from 


















Standard and Poor’s DRI 
(Country Risk Review) 
Indicators for government 
effectiveness, rule of law and 
corruption 
Poll 106    1996- 
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Institutions and economic performance: an annotated bibliography 
 
Authors/Source  Methodology  Summary of findings 
Ades, Alberto and Rafael di 
Tella. 1996. ‘The causes and 
consequences of corruption: A 
review of recent empirical 
contributions.’ IDS Bulletin 
27(2). 
Review of empirical contributions 
of causes and effects of corruption 
Corruption negatively affects investment, 
and corruption is associated with the lack 
of competition in the product market and 
with less independent judicial systems. 
Ades, Alberto and Rafael Di 
Tella. 1999. ‘Rents, 
competition, and corruption.’ 
American Economic Review 89: 
982-993. 
Explore the hypothesis that level 
of rents and market structure 
determine corruption by 
constructing a simple model of 
corruption inspired by 
compensation theory. Present 
suggestive evidence on the general 
structure of corruption regressions 
and empirically study the causes of 
corruption. 
Countries where firms enjoy higher rents 
tend to have higher corruption levels. 
Corruption is higher in countries where 
domestic firms are sheltered from foreign 
competition, with economies dominated 
by a few number of firms, or where 
antitrust regulations are not effective in 
preventing anticompetitive practices.  
Alesina, Alberto et. al. 1996. 
‘Political instability and 
economic growth.’ Journal of 
Economic Growth 1(June) 
Investigate a relationship between 
political instability and per capita 
GDP growth in a sample of 113 
countries for the period 1950-1982. 
Political instability is defined as the 
propensity of a government 
collapse. Estimate a model where 
political instability and economic 
growth are jointly determined.  
In countries and time periods with a high 
propensity of a government collapse, 
growth is significantly lower than 
otherwise.  
Alesina, Alberto and Roberto 
Perotti. 1996. ‘Income 
distribution, political 
instability, and Investment.’ 
European Economic Review 40: 
1203-28. 
  
Alesina, Alberto. 1998. ‘The 
political economy of high and 
low growth.’ Annual World 
Bank Conference on Development 
Economics 1997. Washington, 
D.C.: The World Bank. 
Institutional quality is measured by 
bureaucratic efficiency, absence of 
corruption, protection of property 
rights, and the rule of law. 
Ordinary least squares, seemingly 
un-related regressions, and three-
stage least squares procedures are 
employed to demonstrate the link 
between institutions and growth. 
Institutional quality, political stability, and 
civil and economic liberties are important 
for growth. Government consumption is 
particularly harmful in countries with 
weak institutions, where it does not seem 
to improve social indicators or reduce 
poverty or income inequality. 
Banerjee, Ahijit. 1997. ‘A 
theory of misgovernance.’ 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 
112: 1289-1332. 
Develops a three-agent model 
consisting of the government, 
bureaucrats, and the people 
outside. 
Red tape, corruption, and lack of 
incentives in government bureaucracies 
can be explained by two factors: the fact 
that governments often act precisely in 
situations where markets fail and the 
presence of agency problems within the 
government. These problems are 
exacerbated at low levels of development   22
and in bureaucracies dealing with poor 
people. 
Beck, Thorsten et al. 2000. 
‘New tools and tests in 
comparative political economy: 
The database of political 
institutions.’ World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 2283. 
Washington, D.C.  
Introduction of a large new cross-
country database on political 
institutions. Summary and 
comparison of key variables, which 
include measures of tenure, 
stability and checks and balances; 
identification of parties with the 
government coalition or the 
opposition; and fragmentation of 
opposition and government parties 
in legislatures.  
Doesn’t find the result robust enough 
that democracy is more likely to survive 
under parliamentary governments than 
presidential systems. Raises further 
puzzle for future research. 
Broadman, Harry G. and 
Francesca Recanatini. 2000. 
‘Seeds of corruption: Do 
market institutions matter?’ 
World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 2368. 
Washington, D.C. 
Presents an analytical framework 
to examine role of market 
institutions in rent seeking.  
Provides preliminary evidence on the link 
between the development of market 
institutions and incentives for corruption. 
Brunnetti, Aymo, Gregory 
Kisunko, and Beatrice Weder. 
1997. ‘ Institutional obstacles 
of doing business: Region-by-
region results from a 
worldwide survey of the 
private sector. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 
1759. Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank. 
Survey of business establishments 
around the world to construct an 
index of the ‘credibility of rules’, 
composed of ‘the predictability of 
rule making, subjective perceptions 
of political instability, security of 
persons and property, predictability 
of judicial enforcement, and 
corruption.’ Cross-firm and cross-
country regressions are used to test 
the relationship between the 
credibility index and economic 
growth. 
Credibility promotes investment and 
economic growth 
Burnside, Craig and David 
Dollar. 1998. ‘Aid, policies, 
and growth.’ World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 1777. 
Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank. 
Panel regressions measuring the 
relationships between aid, policies, 
and growth for 56 countries over 
six four-year time periods. 
Aid has a positive impact on growth in 
developing countries with good fiscal, 
monetary, and trade policies. Aid does 
not appear to affect policies 
systematically either positively or 
negatively. 
Burnside, Craig and David 
Dollar. 1998. ‘Aid, the 
incentive regime, and poverty 
reduction.’ World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 1937. 
Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank.  
Panel regressions explaining the 
impact of aid on growth in 
developing countries. Indicators 
include both macro and micro 
dimensions: decline in infant 
mortality, initial conditions, growth 
of per capita income, government 
consumption, aid/GNP. 
Aid spurs growth and poverty reduction 
only in a good policy environment. In 
developing countries with weak 
economic management, there is no 
relationship between aid and change in 
infant mortality in cases which a recipient 
has a relatively good management. 
Campos, Nauro F. 2000. 
‘Context is everything: 
Measuring institutional change 
in transition economies.’ World 
Bank Policy Research Working 
Presents measures to map 
institution building. Collects data 
and constructs indicators for five 
institutional dimensions: 
accountability of the executive, 
In its effects on per capita income and 
school enrollment, rule of law turns out 
to be the most important institutional 
dimension. In terms of life expectancy, 
however, bureaucratic quality plays the   23
Paper 2269. Washington, D.C.  quality of the bureaucracy, rule of 
law, character of policymaking 
process, and strength of civil 
society. 
most crucial role. Moreover, institutions 
are not immutable: they do change over 
time. 
Chong, Alberto and Cesar 
Calderon. 1997. ‘ Empirical 
tests on the causality and 
feedback between institutional 
measures and economic 
growth.’ Mimeograph. The 
World Bank, Washington, 
D.C. 
Geweke decomposition is used to 
test the causality and feedback 
between institutional measures 
(such as contract enforceability, 
nationalization potential, 
infrastructure quality, bureaucratic 
delays, and a composite index of 
the above four) and economic 
growth. 
Improving institutional development 
promotes economic growth in 
developing countries. 
Chong, Alberto and Cesar 
Calderon. 1997. ‘ Institutional 
change and poverty, or why is 
it worth it to reform the state?’  
Mimeograph. The World 
Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Cross-country regressions using 
measures of risk of expropriation, 
risk of contract repudiation, law 
and order, corruption in 
government and quality of 
bureaucracy for institutional 
development, and measures 
proposed by Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke for poverty 
Improvements in institutional efficiency 
reduce the degree, severity, and incidence 
of poverty. 
Chong, Alberto and Cesar 
Calderon. 1998. ‘ Institutional 
efficiency and income 
inequality: Cross-country 
empirical evidence.’  
Mimeograph. The World 
Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Cross-country regressions using a 
composite index of institutional 
efficiency based on measures of 
corruption of government, quality 
of bureaucracy, law and order 
tradition, risk of expropriation and 
risk of contract repudiation. 
For poor countries, institutional 
efficiency is positively linked with income 
inequality, and for rich countries it is 
negatively linked with income inequality. 
Collier, Paul and Anke 
Hoeffler. 2000. ‘Greed and 
grievance in civil war.’ World 
Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 2355. Washington, D.C. 
Set up a simple rational choice 
model of greed-rebellion and 
contrast its predictions with those 
of a simple grievance model. Logit 
regression is used to predict the 
risk that a civil war will start during 
a five-year sub-period. 
Opportunities for predation (controlling 
for primary commodity exports) cause 
conflict and the grievances this generates 
induce diasporas to finance further 
conflict. 
Cukierman, Alex, Steven 
Webb, and Bilin Neyapti. 
1994. ‘Measuring central bank 
independence and its effect on 
policy outcomes.’ International 
Center for Economic Growth 
Occasional Paper 58:1-62 
Cross-country regressions used to 
develop four different rankings of 
central bank independence: legal, 
governor’s turnover rates, 
responses of specialists to 
questionnaire on central bank 
independence, and an aggregation 
of the first two. 
Legal independence is a statistically 
significant determinant of price stability 
among industrial countries, but not 
developing countries. The rate of 
governors’ turnover contributes 
significantly to explaining inflation in 
developing countries and in explaining 
variations in inflation across the overall 
sample of countries. An inflation-based 
index of overall central bank 
independence, combining legal and 
turnover information, helps explain 
cross-country variations in the inflation 
rate. 
Cull, Robert. 1998. ‘How 
deposit insurance affects 
Cross-country regressions in levels 
and differences 
Explicit deposit insurance is positively 
correlated with subsequent increases in   24
financial depth.’ World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 
1875. Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank. 
financial depth if adopted when 
government credibility and institutional 
development are high. 
Dailami, Mansoor. 2000. 
‘Financial openness, 
democracy, and redistributive 
policy.’ World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 2372. 
Washington, D.C. 
Brief review of the evolution of the 
international financial system. 
Develops an analytical framework 
for a welfare cost-benefit analysis 
of financial openness to 
international capital flows. The 
economic investigation involves 
the use of logit analysis. 
Suggests a positive and stistically 
significant correlation between 
democracy, open capital flows, and 
redistributive social policies. Moreover, 
redistributive social policies are key in 
determining the likelihood that countries 
can successfully combine an openness to 
international capital mobility with 
democratic forms of government. 
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli and 
Enrica Detragiache. 1998. 
‘Financial liberalization and 
financial fragility.’ 
Development Research 
Group. The World Bank, 
Washington, D.C. 
Panel logit regressions using rule of 
law, corruption, and contract 
enforcement as measures for 
institutional development as 
determinants of the probability of 
financial crisis after interest-rate 
liberalizations. 
Banking crises are more likely to occur 
after financial liberalization. However, 
the effect of financial liberalization on the 
fragility of the banking sector is weaker 
when the institutions are more 
developed. 
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La 
Porta, Florencio L. Silanes, and 
Andrei Shleifer. 2000. ‘The 
regulation of entry.’ NBER 
Working Paper 7892. 
Massachusetts.  
Provide new data on the regulation 
of entry of start-up firms in 75 
countries. The data set contains 
information on the number of 
procedures, official time, and 
official cost that a start-up must 
bear before it can operate legally. 
Regression techniques are 
employed to support the 
underlying hypothesis 
The official costs of entry are high in 
most countries. Countries with heavier 
regulation of entry have higher 
corruption and larger unofficial 
economies, but not better quality of 
public or private goods. Countries with 
more democratic and limited 
governments have fewer entry 
regulations. The evidence is consistent 
with the ‘grabbing hand’ view that entry 
regulation benefits politicians and 
bureaucrats. 
Dollar, David, and Lant 
Pritchett. 1998. Assessing Aid: 
What Works, What Doesn’t, and 
Why. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Qualitative and quantitative 
analysis explaining the interaction 
of government policies and the 
quality of governance. 
‘Sound management’measured by the 
quality of bureaucracy, rule of law, and 
the pervasiveness of 
corruptionincreases the effects of 
financial aid. It also improves social 
indicators beyond what good policies 
alone could bring. 
Fisher, Stanley. 1993. ‘The role 
of macro-economic factors in 
growth.’ Journal of Monetary 
Economics 32: 485-512. 
Regression analog of growth 
accounting used to present cross-
sectional and panel regressions 
showing relationship between 
growth and macroeconomic 
factors. 
Growth is negatively associated with 
inflation, large budget deficits, and 
distorted foreign exchange markets. 
Hence good policies are conducive to 
faster growth. 
Friedman, Eric, Simon 
Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, 
and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton. 
1999. ‘Dodging the grabbing 
hand: The determinants of 
unofficial activity in 69 
Across 69 countries, higher tax 
rates are associated with less 
unofficial activity as a percent of 
GDP, but corruption is associated 
with more unofficial activity. 
Entrepreneurs go underground not 
Corrupt governments become small 
government and only relatively uncorrupt 
governments can sustain high taxes.   25
countries.’ Journal of Public 
Economics. 
to avoid official taxes but to reduce 
the burden of bureaucracy and 
corruption. Dodging the ‘grabbing 
hand’ in this way reduces tax 
revenues as a percent of both 
official and total GDP. 
Glaeser, Edward L. et. al. 
2000. ‘Measuring trust.’ 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 
115(3): 811-846. 
Combine two experiments and a 
survey to measure trust and 
trustworthinesstwo key 
components of social capital. 
Experiments integrated with 
surveys to measure individual-level 
variation in trust and 
trustworthiness.  
Trusting behavior in the experiments is 
predicted by past trusting behavior 
outside of the experiments. When 
individuals are closer socially, both trust 
and trustworthiness rise.   
Hall, Robert and Charles 
Jones. 1999. ‘Why do some 
countries produce so much 
more output per worker than 
others?’ The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. 
Cross-country regressions using 
two indices: one of government 
anti-diversion policies (GADP) 
constructed by Knack and Keefer 
(1995) with data from ICRG, and 
one from Sachs and Warner (1995) 
that focuses on openness of a 
country to trade with other 
countries. 
Differences in capital accumulation, 
productivity, and therefore output per 
worker are driven by differences in 
institutions and government policies. 
Hellman, Joel S., Geraint 
Jones, Daniel Kaufmann, and 
Mark Schankerman. 2000. 
‘Measuring governance, 
corruption, and state capture: 
Hoe firms and bureaucrats 
shape the business 
environment in transition 
economies.’ World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 2312. 
Washington, D.C.  
An in-depth empirical assessment 
of the links between corporate 
behavior and national governance. 
Utilizing the BEEPSthe 1999 
Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey, 
governance is quantitatively 
assessed from the perspective of 
3000 firms in 20 countries.  
Unbundling the measurement of 
governance and corruption empirically 
suggests the importance of grand 
corruption in some countries, manifested 
in state capture by the corporate 
sectorthrough the ‘purchase’ of 
decrees and legislationand by graft in 
procurement. 
Hellman, Joel S., Geraint 
Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann. 
2000. ‘Seize the state, seize the 
day: State capture, corruption, 
and influence in transition.’ 
World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 2444. 
Washington, D.C.  
Empirically investigate the 
dynamics of capture economy on 
the basis of new firm-level data 
from the 1999 Business 
Environment and Enterprise 
Survey (BEEPS). Economywide 
measures for state capture, 
influence, and administrative 
corruption are developed.  
State capture, influence, and 
administrative corruption are all shown 
to have distinct causes and consequences. 
New entrants turn to state capture in 
order to compete with influential 
incumbents. Captor firms purchase from 
the state private benefits such as secure 
property rights and removal of obstacles 
for better performance. 
Henisz, Witold J. 2000. ‘The 
institutional environment for 
economic growth.’ Economics 
and Politics 12(1): 1-31. 
Derives a new measure of political 
constraints from a simple spatial 
model of political interaction that 
incorporates information on the 
number of independent branches 
of government with veto power 
and the distribution of preferences 
across and within those branches. 
There is an explicit link between the 
derived objective measure of political 
constraints and variation in cross-national 
growth rates.    26
The results are derived using 
simple ordinary least squares, 
three-stage least squares, and 
generalized method of moments 
estimation technique. 
Isham, Jonathan, Daniel 
Kaufmann and Lant Pritchett. 
1997. ‘Civil liberties, 
democracy, and the 
performance of government 
projects.’ The World Bank 
Economic Review 11(2): 219-42. 
Cross-national data set used on the 
performance of government 
investment projects financed by 
the World Bank to examine the 
link between government efficacy 
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